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Introduction 
 
This article explores how the two largest religious factions in the former Yugoslavia, Roman 
Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, achieved ethno-religious congruency in the wake of state 
disintegration. The crucial question to this theme is how did religious elites influence ethnic identity 
formation?  
Although the contentious issue of nationalism has received considerable attention since the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s, the complex relationship between religion and the 
process of nationalist identity formation has yet to be sufficiently scrutinized. Many observers outside 
the Balkan arena have frequently characterized the period of Yugoslav disintegration as the outcome 
of a power struggle between megalomaniacal actors. Others saw the wars as primordially linked to 
violent chapters of history. This perspective, adopted most visibly by the international media, 
relentlessly claimed that Serb-Croat enmities were rooted in ancient ethnic hatreds, overlooking or 
underplaying long periods of peaceful coexistence.
1
 Still other, less-primitive factors such as the 
rapidly failing economy of the 1980’s, post-communist social developments in Eastern Europe, or 
geopolitical constraints on the region have been equally ignored many academics. I am interested in 
the complex relationship between religion and the process of nationalist identity formation during 
period of social upheaval. 
                                                          
1
 P.H. Liotta, Dismembering the State: the Death of Yugoslavia and Why It Matters. (New York: 
Lexington Books 2000), 3. 
 2 
The simultaneous declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 signaled the 
initial phase of complete disintegration from a centralized, multi-ethnic state in five politically 
independent entities (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, and the remaining Yugoslav Federation).
2
 Religion played an insignificant role at the 
outset of the secessionist conflicts, which first pitted Slovenia’s territorial defense units against the 
numerically superior Yugoslav People’s Army or JNA. Religious difference, however, rapidly became 
a contributing element as the conflict spread to Croatia and Bosnia. Misha Glenny observed that: 
the wars increasingly assimilated the characteristics of religious struggle, defined 
by three great European faiths-Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, 
the confessional detritus of the empires whose frontiers collided in Bosnia.
3
 
 
Despite the exceptionally high number of inter-religious marriages, an ethnic delineation along lines of 
faith was continuously being applied whether the parties in conflict formally practiced one or not. In 
contrast to many other ethnic conflicts, historical and contemporary religious beliefs and experience 
tend to shape ethnicity and identity in the Balkans far more than in many other parts of the world.
4
 
What contributions did religion make in shaping identity in the turbulent last decade? 
 Detailed analyses of Yugoslav society reveal that religion presents the clearest cultural 
marker.
5
 This does not to suggest that the conflict was exclusively of a religious or civilizational 
nature.
6
 On the contrary, Yugoslav society under Communist rule had experienced extended periods of 
broad-based secularization across the confessional spectrum. Nevertheless, as racial, linguistic or class 
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 3 
differences were not stable foundations for ethnicity construction, religious affiliation became by 
default the only discernable characteristic among the warring parties. Members of the church hierarchy 
of Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs recognized a window of opportunity at an early stage to create 
a more congruent identity. Distinctive religious groups in modern times have often developed into 
ethnically self-conscious communities, but it has also often happened, particularly in Eastern Europe 
and in South Asia, that religious differences have been used or even created to establish or emphasize 
barriers.
7
  
  Religion was effectively manipulated as a cultural marker and mobilized as a standard for 
ethnic exclusion of other groups with little regard to the fragile multi-ethnic tapestry. Leaders of the 
three monotheistic confessions of Yugoslavia (for this project, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy) all 
engaged in effusively distributing nationalist rhetoric with little as to other’s interpretation. As will be 
noted later, such blatant lack of sensitivity for other’s historical experiences reinforced old stereotypes 
and exacerbated current nationalist identity formation.   
 
Necessary Conditions   
 Before any process of ethno-religious identification can be initiated, certain social settings 
conducive to such development must be available. The existence of favorable conditions in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s drastically increased the possibility of religiously motivated identity 
formation. I recognize three pronounced characteristics, which influenced the social and ecumenical 
environment in Yugoslavia. Firstly, massive social, economic or military upheaval is necessary for any 
initial development of nationalist movements. Ethnic communities are created and transformed by 
particular elites in modernizing, post-industrial societies undergoing dramatic social changes.
8
 The 
former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe all experienced different forms of severe social 
transformations ranging from the internal breakdown of social and economic structures (Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary) to violent and/or ethnic conflict (Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia). This 
process invariably involves competition for political power and economic and social benefits between 
competing elites, both within and among different ethnic categories.
9
 Similar to political elites’ 
struggle to consolidate power, religious leaders must also engage in competition to solidify their own 
power base. 
Secondly, the process of intensifying the subjective meanings of a multiplicity of symbols and 
of striving to achieve multi-symbol congruence among a group of people defined initially by one or 
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 4 
more central symbols becomes apparent.
10
 Ethnic demands center around a central symbol, such as 
religion, language or territory.
11
 As confessional affiliation was the most recognizable marker in the 
former-Yugoslavia, both Croat Catholic and Serb Orthodox leaders strove to mobilize religion as the 
central symbol. 
Lastly, efforts must be undertaken to produce greater internal unification. This is achieved by 
elites who increasingly stress the variety of ways in which the members of the group are similar to each 
other and collectively different from others, this process of identifying the other effectively sets into 
motion exclusionary identity formation.
12
 Necessary for this development are nationalist adherents to 
persuade or coerce group members to change their language, religion, behavior or dress.
13
 
This study examines the process by which Catholic and Orthodox elites profited from such an 
environment and implemented these tools to promote a congruent, centralized ethno-religious identity. 
 
THE CHURCH’S CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONALIST IDENTITY FORMATION 
 
This section will investigate how religion was symbolically employed as a factor for ethnic 
congruence and how nationalist identity was achieved along these lines. This section begins with a 
brief overview of the role of religion and secularization during Tito’s communist regime. It is followed 
by a diametrical overview of the historical and modern factors, which made the rise of ethno-
nationalism in the two religious communities possible. 
 
Secularization in Communist Yugoslavia 
Research conducted by Yugoslav analysts in the 1960’s and 1970’s observed a striking trend 
toward secularization.
14
 In relative terms, religious belief appeared less intense among the traditionally 
Orthodox segments of the population (Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians) than in Roman Catholic 
areas such as Slovenia and Croatia or among the Islamic population of Bosnia.
15
 However, despite 
regional variations, the trend indicated a marked decline in the identification and practice of all 
religious activities. Indeed, a country-wide survey of adults revealed that in the fifteen years after the 
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 5 
first census in 1953, the number of citizens expressing religious belief had plummeted to less than half 
of the population, while atheists, non-religious respondents and those indifferent to religion had 
collectively undergone a five-fold increase.
16
 It therefore became less difficult for Marshall Tito to 
promote his style of Socialist self-management and the unitary, inclusive model of Yugoslav 
multiethnic Bratstvo  i jedinstvo (Brotherhood and Unity).   
However, as the Communist regime began to encounter serious economic, political and inter-
ethnic problems during the twilight of Tito’s rule and the first half-decade of the post-Tito period, 
Yugoslav analysts began to identify new tendencies toward the slowing and possible reversal of the 
secularization process.
17
 The failures of economic policy from 1979 to 1985 contributed at least 
indirectly toward religious revitalization; in this period net personal income per worker fell by 26%, 
foreign debt stood at 18 billion US Dollars and massive waste of foreign loans in less productive or 
unprofitable investments in the poorest regions, chiefly Kosovo and Macedonia, made repayment very 
difficult.
18
 Additionally, the end of Tito’s personal control and the mushrooming of internal conflicts 
concerning the accumulated problems of the one-party regime partially accounted for a major shift in 
public attitudes regarding religion.
19
 
A 1985 survey of 6,500 people demonstrated an increased in religious belief; most notably in 
traditionally Catholic and Muslim regions of the country: 62.3% of Catholic families said they were 
religious, as compared with 43.8% from Muslim families and 26.2% from Orthodox families.
20
 
Another countrywide study of citizens employed in the social sector indicated that the trend toward 
enhanced religiosity might actually be stronger among younger people than among the older 
generation.
21
 The younger Yugoslav generation increasingly found itself unable to identify with Tito’s 
central-minded ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ and thus began to search for more representative ethnic 
definitions.  
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 6 
As the economic and social woes after Tito’s death in 1980 continued, members of different 
communities gradually lost confidence in the federation’s legitimacy. The decrease of authority was 
characterized by a shift of political power from the federal, centralized system to the republic level; 
this transfer was constitutionally guaranteed by several amendments, most notably, in 1974.
22
 David 
Brown accurately summarizes such a political malaise: the inability of state elites to fulfill their 
developmental promises translates into the erosion of its main legitimatory ideology.
23
 This forces 
disillusioned citizens to become more receptive to new social justice claims by aspiring political elites 
who depict ethnicity as the alternative imagined kinship community.
24
 The rising desecularization, 
combined with constitutional decentralization, massive social and economic decline and the erosion of 
state legitimacy allowed Yugoslav religious elites, profiting from a vast social vacuum, to create more 
ethnically-congruent identities.   
By 1990, the problems seemed irresolvable. In January of the same year representatives of the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) from the eight republics assembled in Belgrade for the 
last time in an extraordinary Party congress.
25
 The debate was mainly centered on the independence-
minded Slovene Communists versus the Serb Communists supporting a centralized state system. 
Unable to reconcile their differences on reforms for the dying federal system, Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, 
Bosnians and Macedonians returned to their respective republics and began to politically organize 
themselves along ethnic, rather than policy lines. The failure to resolve the immediate issues of the 
federation signified the end of secular party politics in Yugoslavia. 
Both the Orthodox and Catholic Churches actively pursued similar goals of restructuring from 
the remains of the once-inclusive Yugoslav identity an exclusionary, ethnically congruent model 
around their respective belief systems. As the Yugoslav system began to crumble, the elites of both 
confessions took advantage of the social vacuum left behind by the failing Communist ideology of 
‘Brotherhood and Unity.’ Both churches have labored mightily to get close to a 100 percent fit 
between religion and ethnic identity among Serbo-Croatian speakers and have tended to reinforce 
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nationalism.
26
 In relationship to nationalist identity formation, the churches are indeed both militant 
and national and, ironically, reinforce each other, as will be seen below.
27
 
 
The Serbian Orthodox Church  
Perhaps the most central principle in the Serbian Orthodox Church (hereafter SOC) is its 
perception as the sole defender of Orthodoxy against Islam’s expansion from the East and 
Catholicism’s from the West. Ideologically, the SOC offers itself as the underpinning of traditional 
national security and the center of national life.
28
 Several historical events have left permanent 
impressions on the SOC’s ecumenical identity and are therefore crucial in examining its contribution to 
identity formation: the Battle of Kosovo (1389); war crimes committed against Orthodox Christians 
during the Nazi occupation of Croatia (1941-1945) and the participation of Archbishop Alozije 
Stepinac; a nation-wide increase in ethnic tensions beginning in the late 1970’s in Kosovo; the 
Memorandum published by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts; and finally, the SOC’s support 
of the authoritarian Milosevic regime.  
The SOC and its links to the Serb nation lie in the historical origins in the southern-most Serb 
province of Kosovo. The historical defeat of Prince Lazar’s forces at the hands of the advancing 
Ottomans at the Battle of Kosovo serves as one of the most significant historical pillars for Serbian 
ethnic identity and the SOC. On 28 June 1389 Turk forces engaged Prince Lazar at Kosovo Polje 
(Field of the Blackbirds).
29
 Unable to secure support from the peoples of Central and Western Europe, 
the superior Ottomans handily defeated Prince Lazar’s rag-tag army and beheaded him. Instead of 
reciting the legend as a military defeat, the Battle of Kosovo represents a badge of honor for Serbs.
30
  
The Ottoman’s would rule for five centuries with the Serbs regaining independence only in the second 
half of the 19
th
 century (1878) and the SOC reestablishing its autocephalous status in 1920.
31
 
The events of World War II strengthened the SOC’s image as defender of its flock, especially 
those living outside the borders of Serbia proper.
32
 The Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia ended the 
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Yugoslav monarchy under King Alexander I. The German 14
th
 Tank Division entered Zagreb to 
rapturous cheers. On 10 April 1941, Croat Minister of the Armed Forces Slavko Kvaternik proclaimed 
the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzhava Hrvatska, hereafter NDH).
33
 Waving the 
traditional red-and-white checkerboard flag, the NDH would embark on a policy to categorically 
eradicate undesirables from its society: Serbs, Jews and Roma.
34
 Although the NDH and its Ustasha 
leader Ante Pavelic only lasted as long as Nazi Germany, it attempted to establish a singularly Catholic 
Croatia by enforced conversions, deportations, and mass extermination.
35
  
Despite conflicting stories of his relationship to Pavelic and Croatian fascism, many historians 
cite Archbishop of Zagreb, Alozije Stepinac (1898-1960), as having played an instrumental role in the 
expulsion and maltreatment of Croatia’s non-Catholic population. Instead of promoting restraint and 
understanding toward other religions in Croatia, Stepinac generally supported the intentions of the 
Ustasha. On 28 April 1941, a pastoral letter was read from all Catholic pulpits calling on the clergy 
and faithful to collaborate in the work of their leader, Pavelic.
36
 Other local religious leaders, 
particularly the Franciscan order, fervently took up the message and offered their services in the mass 
killings and conversion of Orthodox ‘schismatics.’  
Archbishop Stepinac referred to these mass conversions in several letters as “a good occasion 
for us to help Croatia to save the countless souls.”37 In his own diary, Stepinac writes 
The most ideal thing would be for the Serbs to return to the faith of their fathers; 
that is, to bow the head before Christ’s representative, the Holy Father. Then we 
could as last breathe in this part of Europe, for Byzantinism has played a frightful 
role in connection with the Turks.
38
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While the exact number of NDH victims is still hotly debated (Croat sources claim 60,000 were 
exterminated, while Serbs offer figures of approximately one million), there is sufficient information to 
assume a large-scale and systematic removal of non-Croats.  
Toward the end of the 20
th
 century, Kosovo’s historical importance resurfaced as tensions 
between the majority Muslim Albanians and minority Serbs intensified. Due to the Albanian 
population explosion and the exodus of Serbs beginning in the 1970’s, the SOC warned about the 
Albanian menace.
39
 SOC bishops from New Zealand, Europe and the Americas formulated an appeal 
entitled ‘The Declaration of the Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church Against the Genocide 
Inflicted by the Albanians on the Indigenous Serbian Population, Together with the Sacrilege of Their 
Cultural Monuments in Their Own Country,’ which contained lists of rapes, murders and the 
desecration of Orthodox places of worships.
40
 This publication acted as a request for improved 
government protection against vandalism of their religious shrines and hostility toward Serbs and 
Orthodox clergy.
41
 
The already precarious situation for both Serbs and Albanians was further enhanced as SOC 
leaders and intellectuals regularly issued charges of planned genocide perpetrated against Serbs, 
without any attempt to align its allegations with its internationally accepted definition.
42
 Obviously, it 
is quite difficult to assess the accuracy of such allegations. Nevertheless, such publications from the 
SOC certainly strengthened Serb resolve not to give up Kosovo and produced a powerful anti-
Albanian feeling among Serbs.
43
 
Six years after Tito’s death, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (hereafter, SANU) 
published a pamphlet simply known as the Memorandum. Although mostly devoted to a calm 
assessment of Yugoslavia’s economic travails and to promoting the kind of centralizing solutions 
favored by Yugoslav integrationists, the SANU Memorandum did contain venomous attacks of the 
persecution of Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia.
44
 It claimed that despite their great sufferings on behalf of 
                                                          
 
39
 Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans.  (New York: Continuum, 
1995), 136. 
 
40
 Ibid. 
 
41
 Michael A. Sells, “Serbian Religious Nationalism, Christoslavism and the Genocide in Bosnia, 
1992-1995,” in Religion and the War in Bosnia,  201.  
 
42
 Ibid., 202. 
 
43
 Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, 136. 
 
44
 Tanner, 212. 
 
 10 
Yugoslavia, they were the most exploited and victimized during the Communist period.
45
 This message 
was ravenously circulated up by the media and received staunch support from the SOC and an 
undistinguished, but successful LCY apparatchik: Slobodan Milosevic.
46
  
On 24 April 1987 Milosevic was sent to assess the situation in the Serb enclave of Kosovo 
Polje. After listening to ethnic Serbs complaints of suffering and mistreatment, Milosevic infamously 
guaranteed members of the Serb minority that no one had the right to beat the people (niko ne sme da 
bije narod!).
47
 By quickly offering its support to the Milosevic regime, the SOC attempted to advance 
legitimate national, cultural and religious rights that were suppressed under Communism.
48
 They 
perhaps did not realize that they entered into Faustian partnership with a despot.     
The SOC sponsored a program in 1989, which, instead of calming the already stressed 
relations between ethnicities in other republics, caused greater destabilization. The six-hundred-year-
old bones of Prince Lazar, borne from monastery to monastery with the media close behind through all 
the areas inhabited by Serbs, not only established the quasi-territorial claims for the ethnic Serb state, 
but also re-awakened days of glory as the first medieval state formed in Southeastern Europe, as if 
1389 were yesterday.
49
  
 Due to 45 years of strict exclusion by the atheist Communists, the SOC leadership leapt at the 
chance to regain its lost stature among its believers by placing itself behind Milosevic’s authoritarian 
policy. In a deceptive counter-reaction, Milosevic actively mobilized the SOC to amplify his future 
aims. The ultimate conflation of Church and state leaders, the exaggerated allegations of genocide 
against Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia and the SOC’s historic role of defending Serbdom took place in 
1989 at the 600
th
 anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje. Milosevic was able to present himself as 
the man who has reversed the defeat of 1389 and reclaimed the Serbs heartland for the ‘nebeski 
narod:’ the heavenly nation.50 Surrounded by a group of black-robed Serb Orthodox bishops and 
facing huge crowds, starved of the romance of history and of contact with religion during Tito’s rule, 
Milosevic declared, in a fiery speech, that Serbdom “after six centuries was confronting battles they 
are not armed, though that cannot yet be excluded.”51 Soon after Kosovo’s status as a virtually 
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autonomous republic was revoked and replaced with JNA and Federal police units to quell any further 
Albanian demonstrations. 
Powerful religious symbolism continued to be transmitted by the media and directly affected 
public awareness. The SOC held an immense posthumous funeral in August 1991 for three thousand 
victims of the World War II genocide, whose bones were removed from ten caves in Herzegovina 
following nine months of exhumations.
52
 The funeral was televised live throughout Serbia. Lines of 
coffins were stretched for one and a half kilometers as the patriarch of the SOC sung the liturgy, with 
speeches held by leading nationalist intellectuals and politicians.
53
 Such actions by the SOC blurred 
the division between politics and religion.   
By 1992 a low-level war in Croatia threatened to spread. Media repression in Belgrade and 
the situation in Kosovo were also on the increase. By this time several leaders of the SOC, primarily 
Patriarch Pavle I, had realized that the dictatorial practices of the Milosevic regime could cause more 
harm than good to its interests in remaining a strong social factor. A defining event was the Belgrade 
regime’s adamant refusal to recognize the results of citywide elections held in 1992. Such acts of 
arrogance, combined with draconian UN economic sanctions placed on Yugoslavia, helped to 
convince the SOC to change its supportive relationship toward the Milosevic regime. It organized and 
participated in several immense anti-government demonstrations in Belgrade and other major cities 
throughout the 1990’s.       
Despite the vociferous criticisms against the increasingly oppressive regime, other SOC 
leaders ironically refused to renounce their support of other leading nationalist figures. In the Serb 
entity of Bosnia, for example, indicted war criminal and former Bosnian Serb leader, Dr. Radovan 
Karadzic, enjoyed considerable support. He regularly made public his links to the SOC and its positive 
influences on his decision-making.
54
 In a Montenegrin publication, Svetigora, Dr. Karadzic, 
considering himself the personal defender of his people and faith, was quoted as saying: 
 
God graced me to do something in my life that is significant, so significant that I 
think it was worth being born, live and die to help my people. God gave me good 
health. It is only difficult to make a decision, then I ask many people, even children, 
and even more importantly we ask our Church. Not a single important decision was 
made without our Church.
55
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            The shift in support came to late and by the early 1990’s the stage had been set for violent conflict in 
Croatia and Bosnia. By manipulating the ancient sentiments of defeat and victimization from the 
Kosovo legend and the more recent atrocities against Serbs by Croat fascists in World War II, the SOC 
masterfully mobilized large numbers of people to realize their shared historical experiences. In this 
manner it reversed what was considered so detrimental under Tito’s secular rule: the state-imposed 
marginalization of religion. Because the single-party system began to experience massive social 
challenges to its legitimacy, the church elites saw an opportunity to reassert its lost importance. By 
initially linking itself to Milosevic’s rise to power and solidifying support from the regime, the SOC 
narrowed the gap between church and state. Serb ethnicity and Orthodoxy were successfully fused into 
a more narrowly defined identity. 
 
The Roman Catholic Church of Croatia 
Many authors claim that the SOC made the largest contribution toward the Serb nationalist 
build-up in Yugoslavia. Contrary to this perspective, one finds little differentiation between the actions 
of the SOC and the Catholic Church in Croatia (hereafter, the Church) and the representation of their 
respective ethnic nation. Detailed inspection demonstrates that the Church bears considerable 
responsibility for inciting nationalism among its believers and reinforcing insecurity among non-
Catholics. 
 During the recent secessionist war and, to a lesser extent, in Titoist Yugoslavia, several 
actions implemented by the Church indicate its contribution to the development of ethno-religious 
nationalism. Firstly, its interpretation of and unwillingness to offer any message of atonement for 
World War II atrocities perpetrated against Serbs, Jews and Roma infuriated non-Croats. Additionally, 
the Church’s relentless exoneration of Archbishop of Zagreb Stepinac from any participation in war 
crimes did little quiet latent fears. Secondly, its alignment with President Franjo Tudjman’s rightwing, 
nationalist party prior to and after the 1990 multi-party elections added further suspicions of its 
intentions. Lastly, the Church’s utilization of symbolism and historical parallels reawakened the 
nightmares of fascist World War II Croatia. These decisions blurred the line between the Church and 
Tudjman’s authoritarian state and failed to pacify non-Croat’s legitimate historic fears.  
The outbreak of World War II hostilities in the Yugoslav lands brought vile atrocities. War 
crimes, however, were also conducted by the occupying German army, as well as the Royalist Chetnik 
divisions from Serbia and Tito’s Partizan force, who massacred thousands of Ustasha regulars and 
Croatian Domobrani (Home Guard).
56
 Without revisiting the topic, I shall hereby only mention that the 
nature of World War II atrocities strongly influenced perceptions during Communist rule and after the 
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1990 multi-party elections. These perceptions severely hampered reconciliation between the SOC and 
the Catholic Church, as we shall see below. 
The Cold War saw West Germany, especially under Chancellor Willy Brandt, apologize to 
the millions of victims for the heinous acts of the Nazis. This moral dimension was best symbolized by 
Brandt’s gesture of dropping to his knees at the site of the Warsaw Ghetto during a 1970 visit to 
Poland.
57
 West Germany did not attempt to offer revisionist explanations of its involvement in World 
War II. Reconciliation with its past and improved relations with its Eastern neighbors under Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik required of West Germany to admits its implication in the horrors perpetrated by its sons 
and asked for forgiveness from Jews and other victims around the world. 
The Church in Croatia showed little willingness to express such regret for the massacres 
against Serbs, Jews and Roma, in which a number of Catholic clergy were directly culpable.
58
 Indeed, 
there is only one documented case of a Catholic official offering an apology. Bishop Pihler in 1963 did 
issue a statement asking Serbs and others for forgiveness.
59
 In the tense atmosphere prevalent in the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the SOC emphatically requested the Church leadership to condemn the 
events of World War II. 
During communism, Catholic officials regularly declared the figures offered by Serbs as 
propaganda. Catholic bishops have reacted by minimizing the number of casualties inflicted, claiming 
that many Croats were killed as well.
60
 The concentration camp at Jasenovac and in other areas, 
according to Croat calculations, exterminated only a maximum of 60,000 persons. Figures taken by 
German soldiers stationed along side Croat forces produced numbers of 350,000 missing and 20,000.
61
 
Even if we accept the Church’s calculations, would not at least some official statement of regret be 
appropriate? After all, there were numerous attempts of forcible conversion from Orthodoxy to 
Catholicism and such an act is ecclesiastical and repentance would be in order.
62
 The simplest 
atonement would have drastically improved the strained relations with the SOC long before the recent 
hostilities began. It presumably would not have reinforced the SOC’s rhetoric of victimization and 
mistreatment of Serbs in other republics in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  
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Enhancing the Church’s World War II interpretation was its vigorous protection of 
Archbishop Stepinac against all criticism. The promotion for sainthood by the Church created 
international outrage, most visibly among Orthodox believers and Jewish victims in Israel. Again, if 
we were to assume that Stepinac was not directly involved in executions, his well-documented 
approval of the Croatian episcopate to actively undertake forced conversion of Orthodox to 
Catholicism deserves stern condemnation. By not recognizing, much less celebrating the fragile 
religious patchwork that was Yugoslavia, the Church’s consistent revisionist stance on World War II 
had a considerable destabilizing effect on the region and incited nationalist tendencies among Serbs. 
This acted like a spiral, reinforcing Croat nationalism leading up to the post-1990 period. 
The first multi-party elections were held throughout Yugoslavia in 1990. The nationalist, 
rightwing party Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica), won control of 
the Croatian parliament, the Sabor, on 30 May and elected former Communist and historian, Franjo 
Tudjman, as its president.
63
 The Church demonstrated unlimited support for the new regime and 
advocated its main objective: secession from the federation. The Church leadership was well 
represented at the opening of the Sabor sessions; politicians and clergy did not fail to use photo 
opportunities in order to be seen together in the media and much was done to reinforce the unity of 
church, nation and state.
64
 
With its immediate endorsement of the HDZ, the Church became the quasi-official amplifier 
of independence and sovereignty, depicting its as a reward to the Croatian people for thirteen centuries 
of loyalty to Rome.
65
 A 1992 article published in the popular Catholic magazine Veritas, author Josip 
Beljan leaves little doubt about the Church’s relationship to the state: 
God has, by way of his Church, by way of the Holy Father, looked after his faithful 
people; spoke on their behalf, directly intervened in history, in the struggle, warring 
together with his people for their liberation. God returned to the entire mass media, 
political, social and state life of Croatia, from where He was driven out forty-five 
years earlier. The cross of Christ stands next to the Croatian flag, Croatian bishop 
next to Croatian minister of state. Present at masses in churches are officers and 
Croatian soldiers. Guardsmen wear rosaries around their necks. This was truly again 
a real war for the honored cross and golden liberty, for the return of Christ and 
liberty to Croatia; here was not a battle for a piece of Croatian or Serbian land but a 
war between good and evil, Christianity and Communism, culture and barbarity, 
civilization and primitivism, democracy and dictatorship, love and hatred. Thank 
God, it all ended well, due to the Pope and Croatian politics.
66
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Under Cardinal Franjo Kuharic, the Church further unified its policy with that of the HDZ. 
For example, the Church supported the exclusive usage of the Croatian language rather than Serbo-
Croatian.
67
 Upon unseating the Communist Party of Croatia, Tudjman decreed the immediate removal 
of all signs in the Cyrillic script (i.e. monasteries, places of worship, Orthodox schools, village names). 
Representing approximately 14% of Croatia’s population, Serbs interpreted this decree as a restriction 
of cultural expression and the erasure of evidence of Serbs historical presence.
68
 
Symbolism and historical parallels played a major role in the reinforcement of nationalist 
perceptions. The HDZ leadership, much like the Church, quickly dispelled any doubts about its 
interpretation of World War II events. Disregarding victim’s historical experience, the Tudjman 
regime reinstated symbols harking back to the World War II period. One such move was the 
reintroduction of the red and white checkerboard flag or Shahovnica, which flew next to the Nazi 
Hakenkreuz. In 1990 it was proudly displayed in front of administration buildings and places of 
worship. The British war journalist covering the war, Anthony Loyd, encountered such symbolism in 
the Bosnian-Croat town of Tomislavgrad: 
Ante Pavelic himself gave me the stiff-armed salute from a large photograph 
[hanging on the wall immediately facing the door]. Various smaller pictures, brown-
edged with age, showed his Croat NDH troops in German coal-scuttle helmets that 
carried a large U center-pinned by a cross on their front: Ustasha. Swastikas, Sieg 
Heils and Wehrmacht helmets. These were still the symbols of gas chambers and 
goosesteps.
69
 
Additionally, the Tudjman regime brought back the World War II anthem, Lijepa Nasha (literally, Our 
Beauty). Such decisions would be the modern equivalent of Germans wearing the World War II Iron 
Cross, singing Deutschland Uber Alles while crossing into present-day Poland or the Czech Republic.  
By the early 1990’s, Church elites, particularly Cardinal Kuharic, began to distance itself 
from the nationalist policies of the HDZ. The Church was quite pleased with the defeat of the atheist 
communist regime; however, its successor became increasingly repressive toward the media and any 
other parties challenging its authoritarian rule. Kuharic publicly revealed, “the Church would guard its 
autonomy and respect the autonomy of state authority, as well as adopt a critical attitude toward public 
authority where it is necessary.”70 The Church recognized the possible risks in remaining a political 
appendage of the HDZ’s hyper-nationalism and, therefore, opted for an arms-length policy. 
In the end, the Church experienced similar success as the SOC. It, too, succeeded in leaving 
behind its prior marginalized position under communism and developed an influential role in politics. 
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Indeed, the Church was able to create a congruent ethnic identity with religion at its center. By 
supporting nationalist policies toward the erasure of Serb cultural and linguistic marks, the Church was 
able to create an exclusionary image of the ‘other.’   
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 Reviewing the actions of the SOC and the Church in Croatia, one realizes that the violent 
breakdown of Yugoslavia was not a clash between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Rather, the actors 
employed concepts of nationalist identity formation along confessional lines with the ultimate goal of 
ethno-religious congruency. 
Massive social changes worked to the advantage of both communities and to the most 
unfortunate disadvantage of Yugoslavia. The deteriorating economic situation, the rise in 
unemployment and faults of Tito’s one-party system, coupled with the waning of Communist 
secularization, produced the necessary social vacuum for such nationalism. Thus, an atmosphere 
promoting competition between elites evolved and both churches intended to profit from this long-
awaited opportunity to re-establish their social position. 
The SOC and the Church masterfully utilized symbolism to support the realization of their 
goals. The SOC’s re-activation of the mysticism of Kosovo and re-enforcement of the massive World 
War II atrocities suffered at the hands of the Pavelic regime created a concise center around which its 
observers began to orient themselves. It clarified the delineation between Serb and Croat by ascribing 
collective blame to the Croats, thus intensifying the markers of separation.  
The Church in Croatia brought up its brutal World War II collaboration with little collective 
regret. Its deliberate failure to offer any form of atonement for the heinous acts of genocide was 
instrumental in instilling the historic fear among the Serbs and the SOC of yet another round of forced 
conversions. This reinforced the SOC’s mentality of victimization and defender of the Serbian 
Orthodox flock. The uncontrollable cycle of identifying the other set into motion the formation of an 
exclusionary identity.
71
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Both parties successfully achieved multi-symbol congruence. The patriarchs of both faiths, in 
particular Patriarch Pavle and Cardinal Kuharic, made strong efforts to link themselves to the 
emerging nationalist regimes. Although they would eventually realize the brutality of their respective 
allies and, consequently, attempted to distance themselves, their initial support created a solid 
foundation upon which particular identities could be constructed. By doing so, they made the division 
between politics and religion virtually unrecognizable.  
 17 
The Church in Croatia mobilized other forms of symbolism, such as supporting the HDZ’s 
Croatian-only language policy and flying the history-laden Shahovnica. The SOC’s posthumous 
services on live television and the procession of Prince Lazar’s bones throughout Yugoslavia certainly 
convinced many observers that Serbs intended to expand their state. These were, indeed, powerful 
forms of symbolism and produced great internal unification among their respective believers, while 
instilling fears in others.  
Although a reduced Yugoslavia has emerged as ethnically, linguistically and religiously 
diverse as ever, despite violent attempts to join Serb lands in a ‘Greater Serbia,’ Serb ethnicity still 
tends to imply membership to Eastern Orthodoxy. Through its own brutal military campaigns, notably 
the 1995 Oluja  
 
 
and Blejsak offensives, Croatia has emerged as a largely mono-ethnic, mono-religious state. Thus, 
Croat ethnicity is inseparably tethered to Roman Catholicism. 
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